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Abstract: With 80-90% of Indonesia’s population practicing Islam, religion plays an important
role in shaping Indonesian politics. To what extent does political Islam play a role in Indonesian
politics and is Indonesia, as a democracy, moving towards Islamism or secularism? Using
Baswedan (2004)’s categories of political Islam, four parties were chosen for analysis of their
agenda and principles based on the outcome of the 2014 elections. Voters’ attitudes were also
examined using survey results gathered by the Indonesian Survey Institute. Analysis of political
parties and voters’ attitudes affirmed the view that Indonesians favor parties that represent
secular values, rather than parties that are rooted in Islamic principles; however, orientation
towards secular politics does not necessitate a less religious or less Islamic population.

On December 7, 2015, Republican presidential candidate and frontrunner, Donald J.
Trump, gave a statement calling for a “total and complete shutdown” of Muslims entering the
United States (Trump 2015). Mr. Trump delivered his statement in the wake of the recent attack
at San Bernardino, CA, consisting of a mass shooting and an attempted bombing by two
radicalized Muslims living in the United States. Just a few months’ prior, former Republican
presidential hopeful Dr. Ben Carson—who has dropped out of the race on March 2016—
remarked in an interview with a conservative radio host that Muslim nominees to the Supreme
Court or any federal court ought to be questioned about their background and faith (Bradner
2015). The candidates’ statements suggest a distrust of the Islamic faith, implying that Islam
exerts a negative influence on individuals in a democratic country. Dr. Carson went further to
explicitly state that Islam is not compatible with the Constitution, arguing that for a Muslim run
for public office in the United States, he or she must reject Islamic principles (Bradner 2015).
Mr. Trump and Dr. Carson are not alone. The Pew Research Center conducted a survey
in 2014 asking the American public is asked to rate religious groups on a “feeling thermometer”
from 0-100, 0 meaning feeling as cold and negative as possible and 100 as warm and positive as
possible. Muslims fall at 40, the lowest and coldest compared to its counterparts (Pew Research
Center 2014). This number seems to confirm anti-Muslim sentiments in the United States echoed
by the presidential candidates. However, is the claim that there is something inherent in Islam
that prevents Muslims from being integrated in a democratic society, the way that JudeoChristian values have been interwoven in the American and Western societies, necessarily true?
The topic of religion and politics is central to political debates everywhere in the world.
Scholars and policymakers alike face a unique problem in understanding the tension between
Islam and democracy in the West and in the contemporary Muslim world. Examples of Muslim-
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majority democracies where the interaction between Islam and democracy can be observed are
few in the world, and some attribute the small number of cases as contributing factors to the
incompatibility between Islam and democracy. However, one Southeast Asian archipelago
country prevails as the litmus test for the compatibility of Islam and democracy. Since the fall of
the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1998, case studies on political Islam has been focused on
Indonesia (Baswedan 2004; Hamayotsu 2011; Mujani & Liddle 2009). As the largest Muslimmajority country in the world, with 80-90% of its population practicing Islam, religion has
played a crucial role in shaping Indonesian politics. The question becomes, to what extent does
Islam shape Indonesian politics? Furthermore, is Indonesia moving towards Islamism or
secularism, and what can this phenomenon tell us about democracy itself?
To answer my research questions, I will draw from the most popular Indonesian political
parties that fit into the literature-based Islamic and secular camps and examine their platform—
their visions, missions, and programs—using the guidelines for democracy set forth by the
United Nations Commission for Human Rights. In addition, to analyze whether Indonesia is
moving towards Islamism or secularism, I will perform a secondary data analysis of the public’s
attitude towards party politics, as well as their attitudes towards Islamic values versus secular
values in government, using data gathered by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI). By using
Indonesia as a case study, I hope to provide insight to the effects of religion in a democratic
society and provide answers to the ongoing debate on Islam and democracy.
Historical Background
After the nation proclaimed its independence in 1945 from three centuries of Dutch
occupation and that of the Japanese during World War II, Indonesia experienced three types of
government: liberal democracy, guided Democracy, and the New Order (Bhakti 2004). “Liberal
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democracy” is a term that popularized by President Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, and is
subsequently used by scholars, writers, commentators, and people in the Indonesian political
community in general (Bhakti 2004). The period was short-lived, as the constitutional document
adopted in 1945 entailed “few well-specified democratic rules of the game” but was only
intended to be temporary (Horowitz 2013, 17). In 1950, the Constitution was redrafted to
establish a unitary state and a “substantially parliamentary” form of government (Ellis 2007, 23).
Indonesia experienced its first free, national election in 1955, where both Islamic and secular
parties flourished though neither was able to secure a clear majority in the People’s Consultative
Assembly (MPR).
The period of guided democracy followed liberal democracy, and was marked by an
emphasis on the executive branch; President Sukarno called this “democracy with leadership”
(Bhakti 2004, 198). He invoked the 1945 Constitution, which gave “greater scope for
presidential initiative” (Legge 1968), and took iron control of the nomination processes for the
MPR membership. Furthermore, the government acted through deliberation and consensus,
rather than voting (Ellis 2007). Sukarno was eventually forced to resign and delegate power to
General Suharto, who was appointed as Acting President.
With his strong military background, Suharto established the New Order with Pancasila
as the official ideology of the state. Pancasila came from the Sanskrit words panca (“five”) and
sila (“principles”), and it stands as the official, philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state.
The following comprise the Five Principles:
1. Belief in the one and only God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa).
2. Just and civilized humanity (Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab).
3. The unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia).
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4. Democracy guided by the wisddm of deliberations among representatives
(Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan Dalam Permusyawaratan
dan Perwakilan).
5. Social justice for the whole of the people in Indonesia (Keadilan Sosial bagi seluruh
Rakyat Indonesia).1
Although Pancasila was first established by Sukarno, Suharto used Pancasila as the
official ideology to suppress all other ideologies and beliefs in Indonesia. Shortly after his
appointment, Suharto secured a parliamentary resolution that required all organizations in
Indonesia to adopt the secular Pancasila as their basic principles. In effect, all organizations,
including political parties, must forego their religious principles in favor of Pancasila. Suharto’s
“policy of ideological homogenization” (Hefner 2000 in Baswedan 2004) resulted in the
withdrawal of mass support for political Islam simply because the government did not allow for
any religion to flourish during the New Order.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis was the catalyst for Suharto and the New Order’s fall, and
political Islam gained momentum with the new opening of democracy in Indonesia. Azra (2006)
notes that Muslim groups played an important role in the fall of Suharto and provided an
“impetus for the growth of democracy” (5). With the fall of the New Order, “Islamic parties”
(Azra 2006) and “Islam-friendly” secular parties (Baswedan 2004) emerged as the policy of
ideological homogenization was dismantled. Increasing demands from the Muslim-majority
population to adopt and implement sharia led, on the one hand, to Islamic parties (Azra 2006).
Others, attempting to comply with the majority’s interests while representing minority groups,

1

English translations of Pancasila are derived from sources of Indonesian embassies in the U.K.
and U.S., both of which maintain the same textual translations from Indonesian to
English.
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form “Islam-friendly” secular parties. Baswedan (2004) describes “Islam-friendly” political
parties as “parties that do not necessarily adopt Islam as their ideology but that welcome, uphold,
and are sensitive to the aspirations” of devout, practicing Muslims (672). The leaders of these
parties come from predominantly pious Muslim backgrounds.
Political Islam in Indonesia
Scholars have grouped Indonesian Muslims into two camps: santri, the devout or
practicing Muslims, and syncretists [sic], the nominal or non-practicing Muslims (Baswedan
2005). I prefer to use Suryadinata (1998)’s colloquial phrasing for the syncretic group as
belonging to the abangan (nominal Muslim) political culture. The existence of the santri and
abangan cultures is a result of the uneven spread of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago
(Suryadinata 1988). Both groups adhere to the Sunni Islam tradition.
Devout Muslims falling into the santri tradition are further subdivided into traditionalists
and modernists (Baswedan 2004), or similarly, the radicals and moderates (Suryadinata 1988).
The traditionalists/radicals and modernists/moderates are divided based on their regard of the
understanding of Sharia, or Islamic law. Traditionalists/radicals want to establish an Islamic
state, while modernists/moderates advocate for a “personal and direct approach” to the Qur’an in
interpreting God’s intention (Baswedan 2004, 670). Individuals who are Modernist/moderate
insist on the major role of Islam in Indonesian society and politics, but do not want to establish
an Islamic state (Suryadinata 1988).
Political Islam, then, refers to the efforts that promote an Islamic agenda and aspirations
specifically of santri Muslims into laws and policies through the democratic, electoral, and
representative process (Baswedan 2004). These aspirations include the penetration of Islamic
teachings to the state’s moral foundation, the policies they produce, and include efforts to

5

incorporate Sharia into the Indonesian Constitution and promote the empowerment of a proper
Muslim society (Baswedan 2004). When political pundits refer to “Sharia law” in the West, they
are referring to the traditional, at times radical, view of political Islam in the Indonesian context.
Scholars have found that Indonesia is moving towards a more secular state, foregoing
previous Islamist principles (Baswedan 2004; Hamayotsu 2011; Mujani & Liddle 2009). In the
1980s, proponents of a secular state were split into two camps regarding the relationship between
Muslim aspirations and the sustainability of Pancasila as Indonesia’s non-religious political
philosophy (Baswedan 2004). The two camps are “secular-inclusive” and “secular-exclusive.”
The secular-inclusive group of political parties welcome Islam-inspired agendas to the
extent that they correspond to and do not contradict with Pancasila. They perceive Pancasila as
compatible with Islam, and thus are in favor of pursuing an Islamic society, but not an Islamic
state. This view was promoted by Norcholish Madjid, a vocal proponent of delinking the formal
relationship between the state and Islam (Baswedan 2004)—a separation between “church” and
state, so to speak. The agenda of the “secular-inclusive” group of political parties would be the
most familiar, and I argue most favorable, to the Western world, as Madjid likened the
development of an Islamic society with this agenda is similar to that of the United States with its
Judeo-Christian values (Ramage 1995 through Baswedan 2004).
The secular-inclusive camp of political parties claim that not only is it legitimate but also
natural that the government reflects moral values of Islam, as Indonesia is a Muslim-majority
state that retains a non-religious basis. On the contrary, the “secular-exclusive” camp strictly
excludes Islam-inspired agendas. Led by Abdurrahman Wahid, this camp believes that the
development of the Islamic society consistent with the secular-inclusive view would lead to the
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Islamization of the state (Baswedan 2004). Accommodating Islamic moral values would threaten
both the secular basis of the state and tolerance towards religious and ethnic minority groups.
Today, the dynamic interactions between Muslim aspirations and the politics of secular
Pancasila have made the dichotomy between the two camps less strong, and resulted in the
pluralism of political Islam (Baswedan 2004). Views of the two largest Islamic organizations,
Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, have become pluralistic—they no longer share an
agenda of adopting Sharia into the Indonesian Constitution. The shift of these organizations’
views towards pluralism does not mean that they are no longer Islamic, but rather, they presently
reflect the realization of Indonesian Muslims today that Islamic aspirations can be fulfilled by the
state without formal adoption of Sharia or even through Islamic political parties.
Baswedan (2004) uses the seven major political parties from Indonesia’s 1999 elections
to analyze the spectrum of political Islam in Indonesia. He found that in the post-Suharto era,
Muslims have become more pragmatic in their politics, focusing more on the policies rather than
the philosophical foundation of the state. The shift towards pragmatism among Indonesian
Muslims created a spectrum of political Islam, in addition to the secular-exclusive camp that
remained the same: Islamist, Islam-inclusive, and secular-inclusive (Baswedan 2004). Below is a
chart that illustrates the changes in the Indonesian political party system over time.
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*Drawn from Baswedan (2004; 2011)

Islamist parties are those that “clearly adhere to Islam as their ideology” and fit the
definition of what most scholars commonly understand as Islamic parties (Baswedan 2004, 680).
Political parties that derive support from Islamic organizations but appear pluralistic are said to
be Islam-inclusive (Baswedan 2004). The aforementioned Islamic organizations of NU and
Muhammadiyah have manifested themselves to be the basis of the National Awakening Party
(PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN), respectively. They are Islam-inclusive parties as
they draw support from Islamic organizations but do not explicitly pursue an Islamic agenda.
Lastly, secular-inclusive parties are welcome to Islamic aspirations, but oppose the formal
adoption of Sharia (Baswedan 2004).

Islamism versus Secularism
8

Adhering to the pragmatism of Indonesian voters, Hamayotsu (2011) finds that
electorates do not uphold party ideology or religious identity as the most important aspects in a
political party. Rather, they favor a party that “provides material rewards and/or cares about the
daily welfare of people” (Hamayotsu 2011, 980). She attributes this sense of pragmatism to the
extremely competitive electoral competitions against the backdrop of Indonesia’s weak law
enforcement, creating corruption and money politics, among others, as well as Indonesia’s weak
bureaucracy, which left the government ineffective (Hamayotsu 2011).
Mujani & Liddle (2009) analyzed a series of 16 post-election surveys to find that most
Indonesians would choose one of the three main secular parties as opposed to their Islaminclusive and Islamist counterparts. The surveys were conducted by the Indonesian Survey
Institute (LSI) between April 2004 and January 2009. 48% of the respondents would vote for one
of the three main secular parties: Golkar, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), and the
Democratic Party (PD). By April 2009, these parties, along with two new secular parties, Great
Indonesia Movement (Gerindra) and People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), had increased their
vote ratio to 58%. In contrast, the popularity of their Islam-inclusive and Islamist counterparts
range between 11% to 18%, a stark difference to the values above.
Interestingly, PDI-P, the party that is generally believed to be the most committed to
secularism and separation of “church” and state, has recently created a “new affiliate” for
religious Muslims (Mujani & Liddle 2009). This evidence leads some to dispute the
secularization of political parties—the state is becoming less secular, not more. Tanuwidjaja
(2009) argues that it is exactly the decline of Islamic parties’ popularity and electoral power that
is evidence of Islam’s penetration into the nationalist, secular, Pancasila-based political parties,
as Islamic parties are no longer the only avenue for Muslim aspirations. Despite the “minority”
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status of both Islamist and Islam-inclusive political parties in the Indonesian parliament, a
number of laws have been introduced, both at the national and local levels, that promote a
religiously conservative agenda. Tanuwidjaja (2009) cites the example of the continuing issue of
religious violence running counter to the hypothesis that religion is declining in Indonesian
politics. This is attributed to the fact that politicians do indeed understand that religion carries
political implications. Islam, practiced by 80-90% percent of Indonesia’s constituency, is still a
significant and influential political force in the nation.
Furthermore, upon examination of several surveys conducted in Indonesia by different
organizations from 2001 to 2009, there is an increasing pattern of religiosity and even
conservatism in Indonesian society. While support for Islamic parties is in decline, and indeed its
popularity has never exceeded that of its secular-inclusive opponents, Tanuwidjaja (2009) argues
that there is a problem in assuming that only Islamic parties have an explicit Islamic agenda.
Pepinsky et al. (2012)’s analysis in testing Islam’s political advantage, which they
hypothesized to be manifested when voters are unsure of parties’ economic platforms, is
consistent with Tanuwidjaja (2009)’s notion that strikes the Islamic agenda as only being
apparent in Islamic parties. Pepinsky et al. (2012) found that Islamic piety does not always
manifest itself in political parties that explicitly embrace Islam or push Islamic agenda forward.
In fact, they contend that Indonesian voters are “like voters anywhere else in the world,” in that
they rated welfare, employment, and national security as more important concerns than
“implementing Islamic law” or “protecting Moral Values” (Pepinsky et al. 2012, 397). These are
values that Islamist, Islamic-inclusive, and secular-inclusive parties alike all agree on. While
political Islam may not be triumphant in elections, its strong hold in Indonesian society may be
due to increasing piety and religiosity.
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Methods & Hypotheses
I will answer the question, “To what extent does Islam affect or shape Indonesian
politics?” by examining the platforms of Indonesian political parties. In particular, I will be
checking for the following essential elements of democracy as proposed by the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter simply the UN): respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms; freedom of association; freedom of expression and opinion; and access to
power and its exercise in accordance with the rule of law (“Democracy and Human Rights”). For
the sample, I will draw the best-performing parties, meaning those that garnered the most votes
in the 2014 legislative elections, that fit each category of political party as proposed by
Baswedan (2004). The following parties are chosen for analysis:
1. Secular-exclusive: Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P).
2. Secular-inclusive: Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra).
3. Islam-inclusive: National Mandate Party (PAN).
4. Islamist: Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).
I will be referring to each party by their initials for ease of reporting and consistency of naming
in the Indonesian political party system.
The order of the parties listed above are drawn from the results of the 2014 legislative
elections. PDI-P proved to be the most popular party, gaining 19.46% of the popular vote,
followed by Gerindra with 13.04%, PAN at 8.75%, and PKS at 7.14%. Given the election results
and the literature on the Indonesian public’s move towards pragmatism, I hypothesize that Islam
does not affect politics as much as other issues, e.g. the economy, with respect to the agenda of
the political parties. That is to say, in general, most of the political parties do not take into
account or include specific Islamic values or teachings in their vision, mission, and goals.
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In addition, I will answer the question, “As a democracy, is Indonesia moving towards
Islamism or secularism?” by analyzing data gathered by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI).
Specifically, I will be analyzing the data on Attitudes on Party Politics compiled in January
2015, as well as the data on Islamic Politics versus Secular Politics in October 2007. Following
the results of the elections and the literature suggesting a move towards secularism, I expect to
see a trend towards secularization and away from Islamization in Indonesian politics, thereby
proving that a Muslim-majority population does not necessitate negative effects on democracy,
democratic processes, and/or sustaining a democratic government. Rather, the presence of
democracy itself makes the Muslim population more moderate and in favor of secular laws.
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P)
PDI-P is considered a secular-exclusive political party, as the party strictly excludes an
Islamic agenda. This is evident in PDI-P’s declaration of Pancasila as the official party ideology,
holding the party as a “tool of struggle and organizing for the masses” (“Visi & Misi”). In
general, PDI-P’s platform focuses specifically on the welfare of the people. Under its Vision and
Mission (“Visi & Misi”), PDI-P outlines its duties in a three-fold way. First, to realize the
suffering of the people’s mandate as set forth in the ideals of the State proclaimed on August 17,
1945, which is Indonesia’s Independence Day. Second, to maintain and implement Pancasila as
the basis and direction of the nation and state. Specifically, it holds Pancasila as a source of
inspiration and hope, the norms regulating behavior of policy and institutional and party
members, as well as a mirror of the overall identity of the party. Finally, it is PDI-P’s duty to
maintain Indonesia’s sovereignty over politics and self-sufficiency in economy, culture, and
personality. These duties align with the party’s commitment to Pancasila as its ideology,
focusing specifically on sovereignty, independence, and prosperity rather than moral or religious
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values. Thus far, PDI-P’s duties correlate with UN’s democratic principle of the exercise of
power in accordance with the rule of law.
Furthermore, the goals of PDI-P are outlined in its Dasa Prasetiya, or General Directions.
The Party has a list of Ten Prasetiya, or ten pledges of allegiance, containing the principles that
PDI-P upholds to achieve empowerment and equitable welfare of the People (“Dasa Prasetya
Partai”). In their General Directons, PDI-P commits to strengthening the economy, providing
food and housing for the people, free medical expenses and cost of education, and providing for
faster and cheaper public services, among others (“Dasa Prasetya Partai”). PDI-P also focuses on
an array of democratic principles, such as reforming the government bureaucracy, enforcing the
unitary republic government of Indonesia, Pancasila, and the Constitution, upholding the
principles of justice and human rights in accordance to the law, and enforcing the principles of
participatory democracy in the decision-making process, i.e. encouraging the masses to vote and
partake in the democratic processes (“Dasa Prasetya Partai”). As PDI-P’s goals show a strong
focus on a number of democratic principles, I argue that PDI-P is the most democratic out of the
four parties chosen for analysis. PDI-P’s commitment to democracy, rooted in secular-exclusive
ideals, proved to be the most popular among Indonesians, with the current president of Indonesia
belonging to this party.
Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra)
Unsurprisingly, the secular-inclusive Gerindra party has the same ideals of the Indonesian
state as PDI-P. That is, both PDI-P and Gerindra aspire for an independent, sovereign, united,
democratic, just, and prosperous Indonesia, holding these aspirations to be a common goal
among Indonesians (“Deklarasi Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya”). The difference, however, can
be seen in the invocation of the common Islamic phrase, bismillahirrahmanirrahim, in the
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party’s declaration. The phrase means, “In the name of God, the most Gracious, and the most
Merciful.” This distinction is a crucial one, as it is evidence of the secular-inclusive nature of
Gerindra as a political party. While the Party is not Islamist in nature, it supports Islamic
aspirations and draws a large support from devout Muslim crowds.

A screenshot of Gerindra’s party declaration from its official website; Islamic phrase highlighted for emphasis.

Gerindra’s vision is to be a party for the people who “crave Indonesia’s wake of his soul,
his body” (“Manifesto Perjuangan Partai Gerindra”). The party proposes an agenda called the 6
Action Programs, which include building a strong, sovereign, fair, and prosperous economy;
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implementing a democratic economy; building sovereignty and security of energy and water
resources; increasing the health and wellbeing of Indonesians through social programs; building
infrastructure and protecting the environment; and having a corruption-free government that is
strong, firm, and effective (“6 Program Aksi Partai Gerindra”). These programs are democratic
in nature and adhere to the UN’s democratic ideals.
Within the 6 Action Programs, I observe under the implementation of a democratic
economy the initiative to empower financial agencies to help people take the Hajj pilgrimage.
Once again, this illuminates Gerindra’s secular-inclusive agenda, acknowledging the Muslimmajority population of the country. With the party winning 13.04% of the popular vote and
gaining 73 seats in the Indonesian People’s Representative Council, the platform seems to be
successful in mobilizing the masses to vote for its candidates.
National Awakening Party (PAN)
As an Islam-inclusive party, one can see a larger influence of Islam on politics within
PAN’s platform. Its mission stresses sovereignty, democracy, progress, and social justice like its
secular-exclusive and secular-inclusive counterparts, but PAN explicitly states that its ideals are
rooted in religious morality, humanity, and diversity. The word “religion” is absent in the
agendas of the two parties discussed before it. In terms of PAN’s goals, it respects and
encourages diversity of all kinds, including an adherence to non-sectarian and nondiscriminatory principles—the first explicit mention of freedom of association and freedom of
expression and opinion. In addition, it also opposes all forms of dictatorship, totalitarianism, and
authoritarianism that destroys freedom of law and democracy (“Prinsip Dasar”). Within its goals,
the Islam-inclusive nature of PAN is evident. It acknowledges not only religion, but it also
commits to a diversity of religious identities in addition to its democratic commitments.
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An interesting observation under PAN’s Political Agenda (“Politik”) is its strong
opposition to the New Order regime, arguing that the current crisis experienced by the
Indonesian nation is rooted in New Order politics. The party specifically opposes any effort to
try to restore the New Order and believes that it should be replaced altogether. Recalling the
discussion on the history of Indonesia, the clear dismissal of an authoritative rule that diminishes
religious freedom and diversity of thought amounts to a strong commitment to democracy rightly
understood. It is evident that a liberal approach to politics with a hybrid of the democratic
commitments of secular parties and an acknowledgment of strong religious influence (in this
case Islam) provides for a stronger commitment to freedom than PAN’s secular counterparts.
Despite this, PAN proves to be less popular as a political party among Indonesians, which
suggests that the economy and welfare of the people are more important to the public than a
commitment to diversity or moral principles.
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
PKS is an Indonesian political party that is explicitly and heavily Islamic-based compared
to the previous parties. It holds the realization of a just and civil society that is prosperous and
dignified as its main purpose. It defines a civil society as a “high and advanced society based on
values, norms, laws, morals sustained by faith; being open and democratic; and work together to
safeguard the sovereignty of the State” (“Visi Dan Misi”). A genuine understanding of a civil
society, PKS contends, must be integrated within the context of the Islamic bond, humanitarian
ties, and the framework of the Constitution (“Visi Dan Misi”). In its extensive outline of the
vision, as well as the philosophy of the party as a whole, PKS frequently cites the Prophet
Muhammad as an inspiration for the creation of the just society, arguing that Islam peacefully
entered Indonesia and will contribute to peace in the Indonesian society. PKS also contends that
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separating Islam from politics is impossible. However, in regards to Sharia or Islamic law, PKS
does not necessarily propose the creation of an Islamic state; rather, the party desires an
Indonesian state that realizes the religious teachings present in universal human values and
applies it into law and government. Furthermore, PKS holds that it is also not possible to
separate the Muslim-majority population of Indonesia and their involvement in political life.
Therefore, it encourages its Muslim constituents to fight secular ideology and aspirations, carry
out religious teachings, and bring Sharia into their lives.
However, according to PKS, Islamic values do not necessarily run counter to democratic
values. For instance, Islam regards the values of justice and human rights as inherent in all
human beings. To PKS, the concrete form of the values of justice and humanitarianism is the
attitude of moderation, a means of balancing to avoid the trap of two extremes (“Visi Dan
Misi”). In applying the values of justice, humanitarianism, and moderation, PKS has a strong
commitment to prosperity and general wellbeing of the people, welfare and economic progress,
unification of morality and ethics so as to avoid various forms of injustice, social justice (based
on egalitarianism), and finally, reconciling Islamic values with a plurality of local cultures—note
that PKS does not specify religious plurality (“Visi Dan Misi”). These commitments amount to
its overall commitment to creating a just civil society, a society that is indeed “just” and “civil”
so long as you are a follower of Islam and adhere to Islamic religious principles.
The lack of respect for freedom of association, or I would also argue the respect for
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of religion, makes PKS the least democratic of all
political parties chosen for analysis. With PKS gaining only 7.14% of the popular vote, it is clear
that the Indonesian public does not find its religious, Islam-inspired message as compelling as
economic or welfare programs proposed by the secular-exclusive and secular-inclusive parties.
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Attitudes Toward Party Politics & Islamic versus Secular Values
Given the background and analyses of secular-exclusive, secular-inclusive, Islaminclusive, and Islamist political parties, how do Indonesians feel about their proposed platforms
and policies? What do Indonesians hold to be the most important (issues or ideology), and how
do they compare to each party’s commitments, visions, missions, and programs? Using survey
results gathered by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI), I will perform secondary data analyses
using their data on Attitudes on Party Politics, as well as their data on Islamic Politics versus
Secular Politics, to look closely at voters’ attitudes and their overall political agenda.
I will first examine the data from the survey on Attitudes on Party Politics. Face-to-face
interviews were conducted to a random sample of 1,200 people ages 17 and up who have the
right to vote. The survey was conducted from January 10-18, 2015, and was fully funded by LSI.
The margin of error was +2.9% with a 95% confidence level. The demographics of the
respondents are representative of the overall population.
The survey asked the question of which properties the respondents held to be the most
important in political parties. Out of the proposed 11 answers (excluding “Other” and “Don’t
Know/No Answer”), most respondents hold the following to be the most important qualities of
political parties, in descending order: acknowledges and pays attention to the desires of the
people (24%); have programs aiming to improve people’s welfare (19.9%); represents the
interests of the poor, rather than just the rich (18.8%); and corruption-free (10.5%). Indeed,
corruption seems to be a recurring theme in Indonesian politics, both in the political parties’
agendas as well as within the public’s sentiments. It is interesting to note that while PDI-P and
Gerindra, stress the importance of Pancasila, only 4.2% of respondents hold Pancasila as
important as do the most popular parties. In addition, political parties committing to represent all
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religious groups or only Islamic groups are held as important for only 2.5% and 1.1% of
respondents, respectively. Below is the bar graph illustrating the responses (abbreviated in the
graph) of this survey question.
Which value is the most important in a political party?
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The results of this survey illuminates the lack of a strong ideological component driving
political participation within Indonesian voters. Voters are more concerned with issues, looking
specifically at actions and programs the parties propose, rather than what they stand for. This
phenomenon could be explained by the literature that hold that Indonesians are becoming more
pragmatic voters. The survey also found that party identification is not strong in Indonesia: 84%
report that they do not feel that they are close to a specific political party. Establishing strong
ideological basis is also difficult when corruption is high. 52.8% of the people surveyed
responded that, in general, party politics at the current moment are more concerned with
advancing their own interests in terms of gaining power, rather than the interests of the country.
While ideology and party identification are strongly related to vote choice in the United States,

19

the same does not hold true in Indonesia. Indonesian voters largely vote on issues much more
than the principles or ideology driving a party’s platforms.
Analysis of the data on Islamic Politics versus Secular Politics illuminate the issue of
political Islam further as it pertains to Indonesia. This survey was conducted on October 2007
with the same methodology as the previous survey by LSI. The survey found a general trend of
the majority of Indonesian masses being oriented towards values of secular politics, rather than
Islamic politics (57%). However, LSI holds that while those who are oriented towards Islamic
politics is smaller (33%), the percentage is still significant. The more power that this group has in
organizing and increasing political activity, the group may become a much stronger political
group in the future.
A closer look at a survey question asking whether respondents would agree or disagree
with a proposed Islamic value illuminates the significance of the group oriented towards Islamic
politics. A response in agreement with the proposed value means that the respondent agrees with
the Islamic value, while a response in disagreement means the respondent agrees with a secular
value. The survey considers 6 values in particular: disallowing female head scarves in public
spaces, legal hand amputation for thieves, disallowing women to become presidents, legal
stoning for those who disobeyed the law, prohibition of bank interests, and limiting elections to
only be for representatives who champion Islamic values.
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The results show a majority of the respondents agreeing with secular values rather than
Islamic values, particularly in issues that are more “democratic.” For instance, discriminating a
person to run for the executive branch based on gender is overwhelmingly disagreed upon by the
Indonesian public. Allowing only Muslims to vote and making the headscarf mandatory for all
females all violate the freedom of association as well as respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the Indonesian public held this view. The evidence suggests that the
Indonesian public holds secular values more than Islamic ones.
For a couple of these issues, the disparity between those who agree and those who
disagree is less than others. There is only a 6% difference between those who oppose legal
stoning than those who do, and an even lesser 5% difference in respondents who disagree on
prohibiting bank interests. However, I argue that the issues of legal stoning or bank interests
affect Indonesians’ lives more privately than politically, and therefore do not pose a threat to
democracy as a whole.
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Upon closer examination of the survey, the data show that less than 2% of Indonesians
belong or are active in Islamic groups, with 13% or less people supporting the efforts of these
organizations (without formally joining). The disparity between public involvement with Islamic
groups but holding Islamic values may be an indication of the privatization of religion. That is,
religion is increasingly moving to the private sphere of an individual’s life, becoming part of an
individual’s identity but not in the public spheres. Put in conjunction with the results of the
survey on attitudes on party politics, Indonesian voters are more concerned with political issues
that affect their public life, which does not necessarily include religion. While they individually
hold Islamic values, these values largely remain within their private life, rather than their
political activities or their view of elected representatives.
Conclusion
Analyses of Indonesian political parties show a general trend of Indonesians favoring
parties with extensive outlines aiming at economic prosperity and promoting welfare. The most
popular parties are both secular and democratic, thus my hypothesis is confirmed that Islam does
not affect Indonesian politics as much as economic and social issues. With the exception of
Islamist parties, which are explicitly Islamic and therefore exhibits the strongest effect of Islam
on Indonesian politics, the lack of popularity of the Islam-inclusive party (PAN) shows that even
an acknowledgment of moral values within the party platform does not supersede more pressing
political and economic issues, combatting corruption being one of the primary goals for both
political parties and the masses. This finding can be confirmed by Baswedan (2004) who found
Indonesian Muslims becoming more pragmatic in politics, focusing less on the philosophical
foundation of political parties and more on their proposed policies.
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In addition, an analysis of the results of selected LSI surveys also affirm my hypothesis
that there is a trend towards secularization rather than Islamization in Indonesia. Survey data
show that Indonesians prefer secular values especially in issues that would potentially threaten
democratic principles. However, a closer look at the data shows that the orientation towards
secular values does not necessitate a less religious or less Islamic population. Rather, Islam is
more important in individuals’ private lives, e.g. having a greater influence on their morals, but
religion may not affect their political views. In fact, data analysis shows that it may be less likely
for religious beliefs or morals to affect individuals’ political views at this time, given the priority
of parties that listen to the desires of the people, welfare programs, battling corruption.
Thus, I argue that Indonesia’s move towards secularism is not due to a decline in Islam.
Political party analysis shows that the most popular platforms are ones that are focused on the
economy and welfare of the people. Poverty is especially a challenge in Indonesia—despite
impressive economic growth in the last decade, 30 million people in Indonesia still live below
the poverty line (“Poverty Reduction”). With this in mind, religion is a less important issue
politically for the Indonesian public, as was reflected not only by the more-popular secular
political parties, but also by the survey results.
There are many limitations to my conclusion and my research. As with any case study,
the unique culture, history, and geopolitical location of Indonesia may have contributed to the
sentiments that are in favor of democracy rather than an Islamic state. The principles of
Pancasila, which are compatible with the UN’s essential elements of democracy, precluded the
spread of political Islam and may have had effects on the sentiments of the Indonesian public
that remain in favor of democracy. Thus, the findings of my case study is difficult to generalize
for other Muslim-majority countries with their own unique history and culture. Additionally, my
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research is based on present-day findings, and the future of Indonesia’s development of Islam
and democracy is difficult to decide given the data set.
As far as my methods go, the 8-year difference in the time conducted between the two
surveys chosen does not go unnoticed. I acknowledge that two elections have occurred in the
time in between and people’s opinions may have changed in that time. Although I can draw from
secondary data analysis and a thorough, critical examination of each political party, my
conclusions are not entirely conclusive, as there are many factors unaccounted for that I may not
have the capacity to operationalize given the constraints of the amount of published data and
research done on Islam, democracy, and Indonesia in particular.
Areas for further research include political theory, exploring theories of democracy and
Islamic political philosophy or theology to establish whether there is a theoretical foundation
supporting Islam’s compatibility with democracy. In addition, further research on the topic of
religion and politics is crucial to examine the extent that religion affects democracies. Research
on nations with a population that are a majority religion of X is beneficial and applicable to all
democracies. The result of this continued study would illuminate the way that religion affects the
politics of the nation, whether that religion is Islam or otherwise. In the case of Islam, it could
serve as empirical evidence for other nations, especially their presidential candidates who hope
to understand the religion’s implications in today’s global context.
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